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Casenote
Cary v. Oneok, Inc.:
Oklahoma Supreme Court Upholds
Plaintiff's Right to Attend Trial
When Americans leave a courtroom feeling that their cries have
been heard, we should all share pride in the fact that our legal
system works as well as it does.
-- Joseph A. Wapner'
Adversary procedure has served as a guardian of individual lib-
erty since its inception.
-Stephan Landsman 2
I. Introduction
Sadly, for the rest of his life, Eric Cary will not enter a room
without receiving curious glares. Eric is different. Severely
burned in a fire just short of his third birthday, he now bears
permanent scars that will likely spell a lifetime of prejudice.
What are Eric's solaces? Surely, his loving family is comforting
and he is fortunate to have narrowly escaped death. But what
of his ability to face those responsible for causing his life alter-
ing scars? Should he not be able to sit and watch while those
responsible for his injuries are made to answer? Is this not
Eric's unequivocal right? The simple answer is no.
Most authorities agree that a civil litigant does not have an
absolute right to attend trial.3 However, courts disagree on
when, if at all, a plaintiff can be properly excluded from court
1. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN
BRIEF 183 (Bruce Nash et al. eds., 1995).
2. Id. at 182.
3. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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when his or her appearance would likely prejudice a jury.4 This
issue is especially prevalent in bifurcated trials, where defend-
ants vehemently argue that the prejudicial effect of a disfigured
plaintiff far outweighs the plaintiffs right to be in the
courtroom.
5
A majority of jurisdictions in the United States believe that
plaintiff exclusion, under certain circumstances, is permissible.6
Most of these jurisdictions follow a two-part test, set forth in
Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories.7 In Helminski, the court held
that plaintiff exclusion is appropriate if (1) the plaintiffs ap-
pearance is likely to cause jury prejudice at the liability portion
of the trial and (2) he or she is not able to assist counsel and
understand the proceedings.8
A minority of courts, including the court in Cary v. Oneok,
Inc.,9 have found that plaintiff exclusion is simply not tolera-
ble.10 Some of these courts have couched their arguments
against exclusion on Constitutional Due Process grounds."
Others have found that the Helminski test offers plaintiffs too
little protection against expulsion.' 2
This case note will argue that, in the Cary decision, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly upheld Eric's right to at-
tend trial, and that the Helminski test sets the bar too low with
respect to plaintiff exclusion. The latter argument is reached
for two reasons. First, a plaintiffs right to attend trial, while
not absolute, is nevertheless a fundamental precept of the ad-
versary system. Second, although a disfigured or disabled
plaintiff may incite jury sympathy, the jury should be trusted to
impartially perform its role as fact-finder.
Part II(A) will begin by examining the case law for both the
majority and minority views regarding plaintiff exclusion.
Opinions both preceding and subsequent to the Helminski deci-
sion will be analyzed. In Part II(B), the background will then
4. See infra notes 15-71 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
8. See id. at 218.
9. 940 P.2d 201 (Okla. 1997).
10. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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turn to a discussion of the adversary system. After providing a
brief history of the development of the adversary system, two
specific topics will be explored: the litigant's role in the adver-
sary system, and the advocate's duty vis A vis the party in
interest.
Part II(C) will address jury sympathy, including a short
summary of the jury's role in American jurisprudence. This sec-
tion will focus on why juries should be trusted to arrive at the
truth, and will examine mechanisms used in controlling jury
sympathy. It will also explore the types of diversions that exac-
erbate the truth finding process. The background section will
conclude in Part II(D) with an examination of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 13 and its applicability to the judiciary.
Part III will focus on the Cary decision, outlining both the
majority and dissenting opinions and summarizing the lower
courts' decisions. The analysis section, Part IV, will argue that:
(1) juries should be trusted to put prejudice aside; (2) a plain-
tiffs presence at trial is entrenched in the adversary system;
and (3) keeping a plaintiff from trial violates the letter and
spirit of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 14
II. Background
A. Case Law
1. The Minority View: The Plaintiff Remains
In early decisions, when faced with a motion to exclude a
plaintiff from the proceedings, courts generally denied the mo-
tion, but did not clearly articulate a reason.' 5 Modern courts
have tried to be more diligent in expressing a plaintiffs right to
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1998).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Sherwood v. City of Sioux Falls, 73 N.W. 913 (S.D. 1898) (al-
lowing plaintiff to be brought into the courtroom on cot, despite defendant's objec-
tion that plaintiffs appearance would prejudice jury); Bryant v. Kansas City Rys.
Co., 228 S.W. 472 (Mo. 1921) (holding that plaintiff, an injured minor, should be
allowed to remain in the courtroom so long as plaintiff is not paraded in front of
jury to gain their sympathy); Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d
394 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding that plaintiff injured by freight train was correctly
allowed to remain in court because the court found no authority for excluding a
party from the courtroom); Ziegler v. Funkhouser, 85 N.E. 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908)
(stating, "[iut is the right of every party litigant to be present in person in court
upon the trial of his own case. .. ).
1998] 197
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
attend trial.16 Generally, courts finding plaintiff exclusion to be
violative of fundamental constitutional rights have offered the
most aggressive argument. For example, in Carlisle v. County
of Nassau,17 a New York state court held that a paraplegic
plaintiff may not be excluded from the jury selection phase of
his trial even though he was amply represented by counsel.'8
The court stated that "the fundamental constitutional right of a
person to have a jury trial in certain civil cases includes therein
the ancillary right to be present at all stages of such a trial."' 9
The defendant in Carlisle argued that the plaintiff forfeited his
right to be present during trial because he chose to be repre-
sented by counsel.20 The court answered that "[t]he attorney is
not the alter ego of his client, but his representative or
agent... [and].. .he may not supplant the client either at his or
the court's unbridled pleasure."2'
Other courts in the minority seem to suggest a rule, based
not on constitutional protection, but on an unequivocal right to
be present at trial. In Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones,22
for instance, a Florida state court allowed the plaintiff to be
brought into the courtroom on a stretcher, over defendant's
claim that plaintiffs presence would prejudice the jury.23 The
plaintiffs, husband and wife, were traveling in their car when
they were struck from behind by defendant's bus.24 At trial,
Mrs. Jones was brought into the courtroom on a stretcher, and,
16. See, e.g., Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 A.D.2d 15, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d
Dep't 1978); Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Purvis v.
Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co., 203 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Mason v.
Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 1996).
17. 64 A.D.2d 15, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (2d Dep't 1978).
18. See id. at 18, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
19. Id. The court determined that the "fundamental constitutional right" was
derived from the Seventh Amendment, which states, in pertinent part, "the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII). The
court also cited the portion of the New York State Constitution that reads "[t]rial
by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional
provision shall remain inviolate forever." Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2). See
also Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 589 A.2d 363, 365 (Conn. 1991); In re Watson, 154
Cal. Rptr. 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
20. See Carlisle, 64 A.D.2d at 15, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
21. Id.
22. 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952).
23. See id. at 397.
24. See id. at 396.
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according to the defense, appeared in a "weak, sickened, and
stupefied condition. '25 In addition to her prone position on the
stretcher, Mrs. Jones was accompanied by a nurse and hospital
attendant. 26 Responding to defendant's claim that Mrs. Jones
should have been excluded from trial, the court stated:
One who institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is
tried. That, we think, is a right that should not be tempered by
the physical condition of the litigant. It would be strange, indeed,
to promulgate a rule that a plaintiffs right to appear at his own
trial would depend on his personal attractiveness, or that he could
be excluded from the court room if he happened to be unsightly
from injuries which he was trying to prove the defendant negli-
gently caused.27
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs presence at trial
was proper, absent any proof that she was presented in an at-
tempt to prejudice the jury.28
In Purvis v. Inter-County Telephone & Telegraph Co.,29 a
Florida court again upheld a plaintiffs right to attend trial.30 In
Purvis, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and
was excluded from trial.31 He was ordered not to appear be-
cause the trial court felt that his physical appearance and irra-
tional and argumentative nature would influence the jury.32
The appellate court, citing Florida Greyhound Lines, held that
plaintiffs exclusion was improper under the circumstances.33
The court reasoned that Mr. Purvis' condition was inapposite to
a situation where a plaintiffs grossly disfigured countenance
would warrant exclusion. 34 The court noted that the plaintiffs
disposition was not so abrasive as to warrant exclusion, and
25. Id. at 397.
26. See id.
27. Florida Greyhound Lines, 60 So. 2d at 397.
28. See id.; see also Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (holding that the plaintiff could be allowed to be brought into courtroom on a
stretcher, where the court, commenting on plaintiffs appearance, stated that "[als
the plaintiff in the case, she was entitled to be present").
29. 203 So. 2d 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
30. See id. at 511.
31. See id. at 508.
32. See id. at 511.
33. See id. (citing Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397
(Fla. 1952)).
34. See Purvis, 203 So. 2d at 510. Specifically, the court distinguished Purvis
from the plaintiff in Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964), where the
1998] 199
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that "[his] mental attitude... [was] expressed in such vague
terms that absent more specific finding [they could] not see how
his attitude would influence the jury."35 Further, the court
stated that "in absence of a showing that [plaintiff] was incom-
petent or so incapacitated that he could not comprehend the
trial proceedings, he had a right to be present in the
courtroom."
36
More recently, New York's Appellate Division, Second De-
partment stated, "[i]t is axiomatic that, absent an express
waiver or unusual circumstance, a party to a civil action is enti-
tled to be present during all stages of the trial."37 The court, in
Mason v. Moore, found that the trial court properly dismissed
defendant's motion to exclude plaintiff from trial. 38 The plain-
tiff, an infant, "sustained brain damage as a result of asphyxia
during delivery."39 Commenting on defendant's motion to ex-
clude, the court noted that "the movant relie[d] solely on a ster-
eotypical assumption that a party's disability will prejudice the
jury."40
2. The Majority View: "No need, No Plaintiff'
A clear majority of courts in the United States have held
that, because a civil litigant does not have an absolute right to
attend trial, he or she may be properly excluded under the right
circumstances. 41 Most of these courts follow a two-part test that
was set forth in Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories.42 In Helmin-
injured plaintiff was described as being little more than a vegetable. See Purvis,
203 So. 2d at 510.
35. Id. at 511.
36. Id.
37. Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993, 994, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (3d Dep't
1996).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 994, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
40. Id. 994, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 197. See also Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp, 562 F.
Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1984).
41. See Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985); In re
Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); Dickson v. Bober, 130 N.W.2d
526 (Minn. 1964). See also Allen P. Grunes, Exclusion of Plaintiffs from the Court-
room in Personal Injury Actions: A Matter of Discretion or Constitutional Right?,
38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1988). There, the author wrote: "[ilf a litigant is
entitled to be present in the courtroom during trial, this entitlement cannot be
traced to any express constitutional provision." Id. at 390.
42. 766 F.2d at 218.
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ski, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action on behalf of
their son, Hugh.43 Hugh was rendered developmentally re-
tarded by in utero exposure to a surgical anesthetic manufac-
tured by the defendant.44 After commencement of the trial, the
defendant successfully moved for bifurcation. 45 In addition, the
trial court ordered that Hugh be prohibited from attending the
liability phase of the proceedings. 46 On appeal, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held, inter alia, that Hugh was improperly excluded be-
cause "a plaintiff with a solely physical abnormality may not be
excluded involuntarily, absent disruptive behavior, even when
the abnormality is due allegedly to the defendant's wrongful
conduct."47
However, the court held that under the circumstances,
Hugh's exclusion was not reversible error.48 It did so by adopt-
ing a two-part test.49 First, "the party seeking exclusion must
establish that the party's appearance or conduct is likely to pre-
vent the jury from performing its duty."50 Second, if the court
finds that jury prejudice is possible, "the court must next con-
sider whether the party can understand the proceedings and
aid counsel."51 In applying the two-part test, the Helminski
court reasoned that the trial court's decision to exclude was not
reversible because Hugh's appearance was potentially prejudi-
cial and because he could neither understand the proceedings
43. See id. at 210.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 211-12. The definition of a bifurcated trial is as follows: "The
trial of the liability issue in a personal injury... case separate from and prior to
trial of the damages question." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 163 (6th. ed. 1990); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The rule states:
[the) court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice... may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
or of any separate issue or... issues, always preserving inviolate the right of
trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or
as given by a statute of the United States.
Id.
46. See Helminski, 766 F.2d at 212. This case was tried in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. See id. at 208.
47. Id. at 217.
48. See id. at 218-19.
49. See Helminski, 766 F.2d at 218.
50. Id.
51. Id.
19981
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nor assist counsel. 52 They so held despite finding that the lower
court's exclusion of Hugh "was inappropriate inasmuch as it
was not based upon the court's observations but merely upon
Ayerst's assertion of prejudice."53
In reaching its decision, the Helminski court relied on two
cases, Dickson v. Bober,54 and Morley v. Superior Court of Ari-
zona.5 5 Both courts held that a plaintiff might be excluded from
his or her trial if the risk of jury prejudice is too great.56 Unlike
Helminski, neither court advanced a procedural test.57 How-
ever, both courts agreed that a plaintiffs sympathetic appear-
ance, together with his or her inability to aid counsel or
understand proceedings, gave sufficient reason to warrant
exclusion.58
Since Helminski, courts have continually followed the two-
part test established therein. 59 For instance, in In re Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc.,60 an Ohio court held that infant plaintiffs suf-
fering from birth defects allegedly caused by defendant's
product should be excluded from the courtroom. 61 Applying the
first part of the Helminski test, the court stated that because
"[t]here is no more protected and beloved member of human so-
ciety than a helpless newborn infant," the infants' presence at
trial would be "inherently prejudicial." 62 The court then found
that "i]t [was] equally clear that the second prong of the
Helminski test [was] met... [T]here was no testimony by chil-
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. 130 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1964).
55. 638 P.2d 1331 (Ariz. 1981).
56. See Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 530; Morley, 638 P.2d at 1333.
57. See Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 530; Morley, 638 P.2d at 1333.
58. See Dickson, 130 N.W.2d at 530; Morley, 638 P.2d at 1334.
59. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); Gonza-
lez-Marin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 845 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1988); In re
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp.
1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Gage v. Bozarth, 505 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. App. 1987); Montele-
one v. Gestetner Corp., 140 Misc.2d 841, 531 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1988); Province v. Center for Women's Health and Family Birth, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Reems v. St. Joseph's Hosp. and Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d
666 (N.D. 1995); Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080 (Or. 1991).
60. 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), amended by In re Bendectin Litiga-
tion, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
61. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1223-24 (S.D. Ohio
1985).
62. Id. at 1224.
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dren... nor could [plaintiffs] assert... that the children could
meaningfully consult with counsel.. ."63 The court did not reach
the question of whether plaintiffs could understand the proceed-
ings, ostensibly due to their young age.64
In Gage v. Bozarth,65 an Indiana state court applied the
two-part Helminski test, finding that the plaintiff was properly
excluded from trial. 66 In Gage, the seven-year-old plaintiff was
struck by the defendant's car, rendering him quadriplegic and
requiring the use of a ventilator to breathe.67 At trial, defense
counsel presented evidence of "city-wide sympathy for [plain-
tiffs] plight."68 Based upon this evidence, the court concluded
that "the presence of [the plaintiff] had the potential to prejudi-
cially affect the jury."69 The court also found that "Gage [was]
unable to understand the proceedings and assist his counsel."70
Consequently, the trial court's order to keep the plaintiff from
attending trial was upheld.71
The Adversary System
History and Development
The adversary system is a part of a jurisprudential history
that extends over a thousand years.7 2 In the Middle Ages, there
was justice by ordeal,73 where God was considered the final ar-
biter.7 4 From ordeals came trial by battle where each party in a
dispute would take an oath that his position was truthful and
righteous.7 5 Then, the two would fight until one party either
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. 505 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
66. See id. at 69.
67. See id. at 65.
68. Id. at 69.
69. Id.
70. Gage, 505 N.E.2d at 69.
71. See id. at 67, 69.
72. See FRANKLIN D. STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE 11 (1994).
73. See ANNE STIaK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 25 (1977). The general concept of an
"ordeal" was to subject a suspected wrongdoer to any number of torturous perils,
such as water, fire, food, and poison. See id. If the suspect survived the ordeal, it
was said that God had found him innocent; but if the suspect perished, surely he
was guilty. See id. at 26; see also STRIER, supra note 72, at 12; STEPHAN LANDsMAN,
THE ADVERsARY SYSTEM 9 (1984).
74. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 11-12.
75. See LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 8.
1998]
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yielded, was defeated, or slain.76 If a litigant was unwilling to
risk his own life, he could hire a mercenary, or "champion" to
fight in his stead.77 Not unlike some modern day lawyers, these
battling advocates would frequently roam the countryside in
search of potential litigants.78
In the year 1215, the Roman Catholic Church announced
that it would no longer participate in such events, and the use
of trial by ordeal began to decline. 79 At the same time, trial by
battle also waned in popularity.80 By the middle of the thir-
teenth century, "[1]itigants looked to peers for redress, rather
than divine retribution or reward."81 Nevertheless, many his-
torical commentators believe that the remains of these anti-
quated judicial systems can be found in courts today.8 2 One
author writes, "[tirial by ordeal is alive and functioning in the
United States - under a pseudonym. Stripped of sword but still
murderous, judicial ordeal is now called adversary system."8 3
Today, the medieval judicial systems have evolved into two
common types of jurisprudential methods: the adversary system
and the inquisitorial system. The two methods employ vastly
different approaches. However, they are both aimed at seeking
truth and justice.
a. The Inquisitorial Model
The earliest inquisitorial courts were the papal ecclesiasti-
cal courts established in 1233, followed by the courts of the
Spanish Inquisition in 1478.84 Although they were associated
with unfettered torture and caprice, the modern definition of
the inquisitorial system is the "judicial procedure in which the
76. See id.
77. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 12.
78. See id.
79. See BAILY KuKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 105-
06 (1994).
80. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 12.
81. Id.
82. See STRICK, supra note 73, at 37; KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra note 79, at
106.
83. STRICK, supra note 73, at 37 (quotations omitted).
84. See HOWARD ABADINSKY, LAW AND JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 24 (3d ed. 1995).
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judges are at the center of the fact-gathering process." 5 In the
inquisitorial system the judge's responsibility is to find the
truth.8 6 He or she controls the trial process, calls and questions
witnesses, and limits or expands the scope of the inquiry.8 7 The
attorney's role in the inquisitorial system is limited to providing
relevant evidence to the court, 8 and suggesting queries for the
judge to ask during questioning.8 9 In the end, the judge - often
the very same person so intimately involved in the fact-gather-
ing process - renders a decision. 90
Opponents of the inquisitorial system have argued that
"[b]y such pervasive involvement with the prosecution of the
case... the judge cannot hope to maintain her impartiality."91
However, those in support of the inquisitorial system claim that
it is "worth the risk of some latent judicial bias to avoid having
control of the proceedings devolve to those openly biased - the
attorneys."92
b. The Adversary Model
By the end of the 18th century, the central tenets of the
adversary system were apparent in both the judicial systems of
England and America. 93 As intimated above, the ideals of the
adversary system have been compared to those of combat,94
where two parties posture zealously until one emerges as the
victor. The adversary system has been dubbed the judicial
manifestation of a competitive nature.95 It has been linked to
the principals of capitalism, and its effect on our psyche has
85. Id. at 24. This type of adjudication is used throughout the European conti-
nent and Latin America. See id.
86. See id.
87. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 16.
88. See ABADINSKY, supra note 84, at 24-25.
89. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 16. If a party wishes to ask a question di-
rectly, counsel must submit a brief to the court, called an "article of proof' and
must describe the question to be asked. If the court accepts the question, it is
given to the judge who conducts the questioning. See ABADNSKY, supra note 84, at
25.
90. See ABADINSKY, supra note 84, at 25.
91. STRIER, supra note 72, at 16.
92. Id.
93. See LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 18-19.
94. See ABADINSKY, supra note 84, at 26; STRICK, supra note 73, at 37.
95. See KuKLIN & STEMPLE, supra note 79, at 105 n. 53.
1998] 205
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been said to mirror that of competitive sports. 96 One commenta-
tor writes:
The fact that our society has so many competitive institutions...
does suggest that the adversary system of justice reflects the
same deep-seated values we place on competition among economic
suppliers, political parties, and moral political ideas. It is an indi-
vidualistic system of judicial process for an individualistic
society. 97
Today, most authorities agree that the central tenets of the
adversary system are party control of the litigation and judicial
passivity.98 Both stand in stark contrast to the methods and
beliefs engendered in the inquisitorial process described above.
The first of the two central tenets, party control, allows litigants
complete autonomy in seeking judicial redress.99 Parties are al-
lowed to attempt any cause of action they see fit, and "[i]f they
want the judge to decide one dispute, the judge will not insist on
resolving another even though [the judge] perceives the latter to
be the real cause of the conflict."100 Further, litigants are com-
pletely responsible for building the strongest case possible. Ad-
herence to this system "encourages the adversaries to find and
present their most persuasive evidence. . .. It also focuses the
litigation upon the questions of greatest importance to the par-
ties, making more likely a decision tailored to their needs."' 0 '
Judicial passivity, the second central tenet of the adversary
system, is perhaps the most notable difference between the in-
quisitorial system and the adversary system. That is, while
96. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 27. See also KUKLIN & STEMPLE, supra note
79, at 106.
97. Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYER'S ETHICS 174 (David Luban ed.,
1983).
98. See, e.g., STRIER, supra note 72, at 13-14; KuKLYN & STEMPEL, supra note
79, at 106-107; LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 2-4. Landsman also considers the
highly structured forensic procedure as an important component of the adversary
system. See LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 4-5. Strier would add the presumption of
conflict, zealous advocacy, a lay jury, and zero sum remedies to the list of adver-
sary system characteristics. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 13-16.
99. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 14.
100. Id.
101. LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 4.
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both systems advocate that the judge be neutral, the adversary
system requires that the judge also be passive.10 2
In the inquisitorial system, the judge is intimately involved
in every phase of the trial, including its determinative out-
come. 10 3 However, in the adversarial system, the judge "is ex-
pected to refrain from making any judgments until the
conclusion of the contest and is prohibited from becoming ac-
tively involved in the gathering of evidence or the settlement of
the case."10 4 If the judge disobeys this mandate, "he runs a seri-
ous risk of prematurely committing himself to one or another
version of the facts and of failing to appreciate the value of all
the evidence." 10 5 Proponents of the adversary system argue
that the most equitable judicial decisions will be reached when
parties are allowed to zealously litigate their most salient argu-
ments before an impartial and passive judge, where outcomes
are not based on bias or prior knowledge, but on the stronger
argument. 06
2. The Individual in the Adversary System
Many believe that the "battle instinct" that pervaded early
judicial practice is still alive today in the adversary system -
only in a less belligerent form. 0 7 By providing civil channels in
which individuals can come forward and resolve their disputes,
the adversary system "reliev[es] tensions and aggressions that
would otherwise find more destructive outlets... [and thus]...
it may be the agent of catharsis." 08 Proponents also believe
that feelings of procedural fairness and satisfaction in judicial
decisions can only be accomplished through individual control
of litigation.'0 9 Under an adversary system, "if parties are inti-
mately involved in the prosecution of their cases and feel they
were given fair opportunity to present their evidence, they are
more likely to accept the results, whether favorable or unfavor-
102. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 36.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
104. LANDsMAN, supra note 73, at 2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 28-37. See also LANDsMAN, supra note 73,
at 1-6.
107. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 26-27.
108. Id. at 27.
109. See id. at 28.
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able."110 Using the adversary process also "serve[s] to reduce
post-litigation friction and to increase compliance with judicial
mandates.""' It is believed that the adversary system is inti-
mately connected to how we identify ourselves as Americans,
and that "party control best reflects the American values of lais-
sez-faire, individualism and competition."" 2 Moreover, "[t]he
adversary system coincides with our prevalent political philoso-
phy because it affords the parties the opportunity to participate
in decisions affecting their interests." 1 3
Being involved in the judicial process can have a profound
effect on the individual rights of litigants. 114 One adversary sys-
tem proponent writes:
Party control .. .affirms human individuality. It mandates re-
spect for the opinions of each party rather than those of his attor-
ney, of the court, or of society at large. It provides that those
views will be heard and considered. The individualizing effect of
adversary procedure... [provides] ... individual satisfaction. 115
The protection of individual rights under the adversary system
is considered by many to be paramount to all other judicial
functions, including the attainment of truth." 6 Those who
champion the adversary process believe that before a person
may be deprived of life, liberty or property, the system "re-
quire[s] that certain processes be duly followed which ensure
regard for the dignity of the individual, irrespective of the im-
pact of those processes upon the determination of truth."1 17
110. Id. at 31 (citing John Noonan, The Purpose of Advocacy and the Limits of
Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1966)).
111. LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 44.
112. STRIER, supra note 72, at 30.
113. Id.
114. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 33; LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 46. Adver-
sary system proponent Monroe Freedman wrote "[tihe essentially humanitarian
reason for such a system is that it preserves the dignity of the individual, even
though that may occasionally require significant frustration of the search for
truth..." MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 8 (1975).
115. LANDSMAN, supra note 73, at 46.
116. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 33-34; FREEDMAN, supra note 114, at 2.
117. FREEDMAN, supra note 114, at 3.
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C. The Jury
Historically, juries evolved in order to counteract the unfet-
tered wheeling of justice by tyrannical governments. 118 The
Magna Carta, signed in 1215, ordered that no man shall be im-
prisoned until he is offered a fair trial by his peers. 1 9 While
early juries were limited to findings of fact, 20 by 1700, juries
were given the power to disagree with the law.' 2 ' Today, this
concept is called jury nullification. 122
The jury is also intimately intertwined with the develop-
ment of the American judicial system. During the British colo-
nization, each colony's charter contained some provision for a
jury system. 23 After the American Revolution, the First Conti-
nental Congress assured colonists the right to be tried by their
peers. 24 In the writing of the Declaration of Independence, the
drafters "declare[d] among [their] grievances against the Eng-
lish King that he had been depriving colonists.., of the right of
jury trial."125 Today, the jury is indoctrinated into American ju-
risprudence with the adoption of the Sixth 26 and Seventh 27
Amendments.
In American democratic society, "the legitimacy of the law
depends on acceptance by the people."128 It is said that the jury
"remains our best tool for ensuring that the law is being applied
in a way that wins the people's consent.' 29 For many "the jury
118. See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 21-30 (1984); RITA J. SIMON, THE
JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5-8 (1980); CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUS-
TICE AND THE JURY 39-40 (1962).
119. See DIPERNA, supra note 118, at 27.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 27-28. "Jury in a criminal case possesses de facto power to
'nullification' to acquit defendant regardless of strength of evidence against him."
Cargill v. State, 340 S.E.2d 891, 914 (Ga. 1986).
123. See DIPERNA, supra note 118, at 28.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "[in all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127. The Seventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "[in suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved. . . " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
128. JEFFERY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 7 (1994).
129. Id.
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remains [the] only realistic opportunity to participate in gov-
ern[mentl."130 Jury duty is a ubiquitous institution in America,
where "the noble principle remains that every citizen is equally
competent to do justice."13'
1. The Jury's Inherent Bias - Mr. Prejudice and Miss
Sympathy
Mr. Prejudice and Miss Sympathy are the names of the witnesses
whose testimony is never recorded, but must nevertheless be reck-
oned with in trials by jury.132
The justice system in the United States has set up a para-
dox for the juror: in one instance we ask that he or she be a
"peer" of the litigants; in the next, we require that the juror be
unknowing and unassuming so that bias may be kept from the
courtroom. 33 Thus, "[tihe local knowledge that gives compe-
tence to the juror as neighbor and peer destroys the impartiality
of the juror as neutral arbiter of events." 34
Critics argue that juries are often prejudiced, ad hoc, arbi-
trary, idiosyncratic whimsical beings that "decide cases accord-
ing to emotion, prejudice, and sympathy more than according
law and evidence."1 35 Following the same logic, some stress that
jurors are unable to evenly weigh the facts or evidence because
of a preconceived notion of what the truth should be. 36
Whatever the reasoning, it is clear that jurors do bring inherent
biases into the courtroom.
2. In Juries We Trust
There can be no doubt that the jury remains a vital part of
American jurisprudence. Why is this so? Noted American at-
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. SIMON, supra note 118, at 21 (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:
MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 108).
133. See ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 18.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 4. See also SIMON, supra note 118, at 15.
136. See DONALD E. VINSON & DAVID S. DAviS, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL STRATEGIES & TRIAL TECHNIQUES 13 (3d ed. 1993). The authors believe that
"jurors' perceptions of the trial process and their ultimate decisions are largely
determined by their pre-existing cognitions which act as screens or filters to inter-
pret, distort or reinforce information presented during the trial." Id. at 14-15.
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torney Clarence Darrow once said, "I never saw twelve men in
my life, that, if you could get them to understand a human case,
were not true and right."137 Darrow's quote perhaps best de-
scribes why the "unnecessary delay" and "total unpredictabil-
ity" allegedly cast from the jury is tolerated by the judicial
system, and society in general. 138 Despite the criticisms, "[a]
basic assumption of the law has been that the jury can under-
stand the case presented to it." 139 Further, jury proponents be-
lieve that "jurors are smarter than assumed by lawyers working
from manuals.' 140
Although it is inherently difficult to objectively "grade" a
jury, one indication of how well the jury performs is to compare
its decision with that of the legal "expert," the judge. A 1980
survey conducted by the University of Chicago shows that in
civil cases, 79% of trial judges would have reached the same
verdict as the jury.'4 ' Further, the study revealed that the diffi-
culty or complexity of the case made little difference in the rate
of disagreement between judge and jury.142 In fact, only in cir-
cumstances where "the weight of the evidence [was] so close
that the verdict could [have gone] either way" did a significant
difference in opinion exist.143 Those conducting the research
came to the "unequivocal conclusion that the jury understands
its job and performs it competently."1 44
Jury trust also stems from the belief that a jury is "[al body
truly representative of the community."145 Gone are the days of
"blue-ribbon" juries, where only people of "above average levels
of intelligence, morality, and integrity" qualified to serve. 146 To-
day, courts widely hold that "the constitutional guarantee of
trial by an impartial jury require[s] that the jury pool be a mir-
137. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN
BRIEF 85 (Bruce Nash et al. eds., 1995).
138. See STRIER, supra note 72, at 107.
139. Id. at 113.
140. ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 5.
141. See SIMON, supra note 118, at 50. The number is even greater for crimi-
nal cases. See id.
142. See id. at 51.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 52.
145. ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 99 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940)).
146. See ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 99.
19981
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
ror image or microcosm of the eligible community
population."147
Requiring such a cross-section of the community potentially
invites as many backgrounds, views, and biases, as there are
seats in a jury box.148 While at first glance, such a requirement
may ostensibly confound jury bias, closer analysis reveals that
once such a group is cast, it "will achieve the 'overall' or 'dif-
fused' impartiality that comes from balancing the biases of its
members against each other."149 Diverse juries lead to just out-
comes, and "Ulurors wishing to... persua[de] [will] now have to
abandon arguments that depended on the particular prejudices
or perspective of their own kind." 50
Controlling Jury Sympathy
Sympathetic clients provide cunning attorneys with the op-
portunity to turn the unfortunate into the tactical - the tragic
into the profitable. Sympathy can be a defense counsel's
nightmare. The defense's "main fear... is that no matter how
defensible the case. . . the jury will ignore the fact reason and
common sense and out of sympathy alone, find for the plain-
tiff.1' 5 However, authorities agree that jury sympathy can be
mitigated, thus preserving the status quo of impartiality. 52
One of the basic steps in lessening the effect of sympathy is
to inform jurors of their role. In its Standards Relating to Juror
Use and Management, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
"recognizes the need to inform prospective jurors of their role
and responsibilities as Jurors."153 The ABA suggests that orien-
147. Id. at 100. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.522, 528 (1975); SIMON,
supra note 118, at 29-30.
148. See ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 100-101. The American Bar Associa-
tion identifies a number of different groups that may make up a cross-section of a
community, including African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans,
women, persons who work for a daily wage, common laborers, non-theists, stu-
dents and professors, young people, and opponents of the death penalty. See
American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management 16
(1983).
149. ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 101 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d
748, 755 (Cal. 1978)).
150. Id.
151. J. Ric Gass, Handling Sympathy In Jury Trials: Introduction, PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 455 at 37, 43 (1993).
152. See id.
153. American Bar Association, supra note 148, at 137.
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tation programs should be conducted by courts in order to in-
form jurors of their role, and that such programs should be
designed to increase prospective jurors' understanding of the ju-
dicial system and prepare them to serve competently as
jurors. 5
Sympathy may also be controlled using pretrial voir dire 55
to eliminate potential jurors, who, in counsel's mind, will likely
succumb to sympathy.156  During voir dire, counsel can
"[i]dentify]... trial issues and facts which will arouse sympa-
thy and question on them."157 Further, each juror chosen
should "promise to set sympathy aside.' 158 Counsel should
"make [urors] understand that that promise is a part of their
oath" and as such the juror has entered into a "contract and
covenant" with defense counsel. 15 9
Once trial begins, defense can discuss sympathy candidly
with jurors while trying to make it look like the plaintiff is rely-
ing on sympathy. 160 Counsel should also "emphasize any incon-
sistency that shows a play for sympathy... [and] ... emphasize
any exaggeration."'161 In addition, when offering expert testi-
mony, counsel should "use experts with disabilities" as a way to
soften the plight of the plaintiff by showing how others similarly
situated have overcome their handicap. 162 Finally, the defense
should attempt to include a sympathy warning into the jury
instructions. 63
In cases where the defendant is a corporation, a member of
corporate management should regularly attend trial in order to
154. See id. at 128.
155. The voir dire is "[a] preliminary examination which the court and attor-
neys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to
serve as jurors." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
156. See John P. Daniels, Handling Sympathy In Jury Trials: General Consid-
erations and in the Defense Case in Chief, PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 455 at 57 (1993).
157. Roy F. Hughs, Handling Sympathy In Jury Trials: Handling Sympathy
in Voir Dire, PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 455 at 80
(1993).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Daniels, supra note 156, at 58.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 57.
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"humanize" the defendant. 6 4 The same corporate representa-
tive should remain during the entire trial, so the defense can
"give the jury some human being with such [sic] to identify."'165
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Judiciary
The issue of whether the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") gives rise to a cognizable cause of action for a plaintiff
who is excluded from trial is yet to be litigated. The fact that
the Cary court addressed this issue in dicta suggests that the
ADA may very well be used in plaintiff exclusion cases in the
near future. 166 Whether such a cause of action would be suc-
cessful remains to be seen. While an entire article could be de-
voted to discussing the possibilities and logistics of such a suit,
this background section will briefly examine the statutory
framework that could be used to argue that the ADA prohibits
plaintiff exclusion. 167
In enacting the ADA, Congress found that "historically, so-
ciety has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disa-
bilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to
be a serious and pervasive social problem."168 Although the ADA
is traditionally thought of as a way for disabled persons to gain
access to employment and public services, the legislature stated
that its purpose for enacting the statute was to "provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities."1 69 Clearly,
the ADA represents Congress' commitment to a society that
sees beyond physical imperfections.
164. See id. at 58.
165. Id.
166. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 212 (Okla. 1997).
167. For details regarding the purposes and provisions of the ADA, see Penn
Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Promises and Chal-
lenges, 27 U.S.F.L. REV. 149 (1992); Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act: What it Means to All Americans, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 375 (1991); Nancy
Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 471 (1991).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
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Contesting plaintiff exclusion under the ADA would mainly
involve Subtitle II of the Act, regarding access to public serv-
ices. 170 Section 12132 of Subtitle II provides that:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the bene-
fits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.171
Determining the applicability of the ADA in plaintiff exclusion
cases involves statutory interpretation of the above language,
especially the terms "public entity," "qualified individual," and
"disability." A "public entity" is defined as "any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or States or local government."172 The plain meaning of
"instrumentality of a State" suggests, and courts have agreed,
that the judiciary falls under the statutory definition of "public
entity."173 Further, case law suggests that "public entity" is to
170. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). As defined in the regulations enacted pursuant
to the ADA, a public entity may not:
Deny a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or
benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;
Afford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or
benefit from the aid, benefit or service that is not equal to that afforded to
others;
Provide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or service that
is not as effective as that provided to others;
Aid or perpetuate discrimination against a qualified handicapped person by
providing significant assistance to an agency, organization, or person that
discriminates on the basis of handicap in providing any aid, benefit or ser-
vice to beneficiaries of the recipients program;
Otherwise limit a qualified handicapped person in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving an
aid, benefit, or service.
45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (1997).
Although 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 addresses nondiscrimination in programs and activ-
ities receiving federal financial assistance, Congress has stated that the regula-
tions "are applicable to all programs and activities [by public entities]." H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 164 Stat. 473.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994).
173. Galloway v. Superior Court of D.C., 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993); See
also People v. Caldwell, 159 Misc.2d 190, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993)
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be given the broadest of interpretations, allowing the ADA to
cast a wide net.174
The ADA defines "qualified individual" as "an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services .. . provided by a public
entity."175 Quite easily, plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers, jurors
and the like fall within the definition of "qualified individuals."
The final threshold requirement of the ADA is for the "qual-
ified person" to have a "disability.'1 76 Gleaned from the legisla-
tive intent of the ADA, courts have established a three-factor
test to determine whether persons meet the statutory definition
of "disability."1 77 The court must determine (1) whether plain-
tiffs condition is a physical or mental impairment; (2) whether
that impairment affects a major life activity; and (3) whether
the major life activity is substantially limited by the impair-
ment.178 Although the ADA does not define "major life activ-
ity," 79 Congress has commented that major life activities
include "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and work-
(ruling that as a "public entity," court had a responsibility to "reasonably accom-
modate blind juror as required by ADA").
174. See, e.g., Stoutenforough v. National Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580
(6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 674 (1996) (requiring the NFL required to
provide hearing impaired persons with equal access to some form of broadcast of
games in "black-out" areas); Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White
Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that city planning board and
zoning board of appeals are considered "public entities" under ADA); Doe v. Judi-
cial Nominating Comm'n for Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, 906 F. Supp.
1534 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that judicial nominating commission is a "public en-
tity" as defined in ADA); Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. Ill.
1995) (ruling that board of trustees for city police pension fund is considered "pub-
lic entity" for purposes of ADA); Colman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb.
1993) (noting that University of Nebraska is a "public entity" under ADA). But see
Ellis v. Morehouse School of Medicine, 925 F. Supp. 1529 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding
that a private medical school is not considered "public entity" under ADA).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
177. See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
178. See id. at 391-92 (quoting Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp.
1393, 1404 (N.D. Ill. 1994)).
179. See Deghand v. Wal-Mart, Stores, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 1002, 1011 (D.Kan.
1996).
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ing."8 0 In addition, Congress has stated that "[tihe impairment
should be assessed without considering whether mitigating
measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommoda-
tions, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."18 '
III. Cary v. Oneok, Inc.8 2
A. Facts
In July of 1989, Lorie Cary rented a house in Yukon,
Oklahoma for herself and her two children - Eric, age 2, and
Erin, age 4.183 Prior to moving in their new home, Ms. Cary
called Oneok, Inc. (d.b.a. . "Oklahoma Natural Gas Company"
or ONG) to request that gas service be turned on. 84 Defend-
ant's technician arrived at Plaintiffs home, initiated the gas
service, and lit the pilot lights on both the cooking stove and the
hot water heater. 8 5 According to Defendant, the technician
also inspected the appliances to ensure that they were in safe
working order. 8 6 Approximately one week after the service
call, Ms. Cary and her two children moved into the home. 8 7
One day before the fire, Eric's father visited the Cary home
in Yukon. He brought with him a lawn mower and a container
filled with extra gasoline. 88 In an attempt to keep the children
180. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
451.
181. Id. Congress has also expressed that the term "impairment" is to be
broadly construed:
[Impairment] is intended to cover those who have a record of an impairment
... [but]... [iut also includes persons who have been misclassified as having
an impairment... For example, severe burn victims often face discrimina-
tion in employment and participation in community activities which results
in substantial limitation of major life activities. These persons would be
covered under this test because of the attitudes of others toward the impair-
ment, even if they did not view themselves as "impaired."
Id.
182. 940 P.2d 201 (Okla. 1997).
183. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201 (Okla. 1997)
(No. 81-356); Respondent's Brief at 4, Cary (No. 81-356).
184. See Petitioner's Brief at 7; Respondent's Brief at 4.
185. See Petitioner's Brief at 7-8; Respondent's Brief at 4.
186. See Respondent's Brief at 4. It is uncontested that the water heater was
in working order and complied with applicable building codes. See Cary v. Oneok,
Inc., No. 81-356, at 2 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
187. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Cary (No. 81-356).
188. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
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away from the gas, Mr. Cary placed the container against the
wall, securing it in place by wedging the lawnmower and other
garage items against the container. 8 9
The next day, Eric was playing in the yard; the garage door
had been left open so Eric could get back in the house. 190 Ms.
Cary had just left the bathroom when she heard the explo-
sion. 19' She rushed to the kitchen and headed toward the ga-
rage where she heard her son crying. 192 Flames burst through
the door.193 Realizing she could not reach the garage through
the kitchen door, Ms. Cary ran around the outside of the house
and into the garage through the side entrance. 94 With the help
of a garden hose and a helpful neighbor, Ms. Cary located Eric
and carried him out of the garage onto the driveway.' 95 She im-
mediately began administering CPR. 196 Soon after, an ambu-
lance arrived and Eric was rushed to the hospital. 97 He was
subsequently flown by helicopter to the Children's Hospital
Burn Center.' 98 Eric suffered second and third degree burns
over 30% of his body.' 99
It is undisputed that Eric accidentally spilled the gas,
which in turn caused the fire. 200 Firefighters found the emptied
gasoline container within two feet of the water heater. How-
ever, the parties controvert the ignition of the gasoline. Accord-
ing to Plaintiffs, and in accord with the Yukon Fire
Department's opinion, the gas leaked out of the container,
across the floor, and met the pilot flame of the floor-mounted
water heater. 20' Plaintiffs also sought the opinion of an in-
189. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
190. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
191. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
192. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
193. See Petitioner's Brief at 8; Respondent's Brief at 5.
194. See Petitioner's Brief at 9; Respondent's Brief at 6.
195. See Petitioner's Brief at 9; Respondent's Brief at 6.
196. See Petitioner's Brief at 9; Respondent's Brief at 6.
197. See Petitioner's Brief at 9; Respondent's Brief at 6.
198. See Respondent's Brief at 6.
199. See Petitioner's Brief at 9.
200. See Petitioner's Brief at 9; Respondent's Brief at 7.
201. See Petitioner's Brief at 9. Plaintiffs make explicit the potential dangers
of floor-mounted water heater. See id. at 1-5. Plaintiffs set forth numerous au-
thorities that now require gas-fired water heaters to be at a minimum of 18" off the
ground. See id. In addition, plaintiffs point out that Oklahoma now requires a
statewide minimum of 18" off the ground for all newly installed water heaters. See
218 [Vol. 19:195
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/8
CARY V. ONEOK, INC.
dependent fire investigation firm, which concurred with the
findings of the Yukon Fire Department. 2 2 Oneok, through its
own experts, aver that it was not the water heater that caused
the fire, but the electrical contacts on a freezer that was also
kept in the garage. 20 3
B. Procedural History
Eric Cary's mother brought suit against Oneok as Eric's
next friend.20 4 In addition, Eric brought actions against the
manufacturers and retailers of both the water heater and the
gasoline container, as well as the landlord of the Carys' rental
home.205 The complaint against Oneok alleged that its techni-
cian had negligently inspected and lit the water heater that
caused Eric's injuries.20 6 Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Cary should
have been warned of the danger inherent in ground-mounted
water heaters before the water heater was lit.207
Prior to the commencement of the proceedings, Oneok
made a request to bifurcate the trial, which was granted by the
court. 20 It then made a motion to exclude Eric from trial, argu-
ing that his appearance would unduly prejudice the jury.20 9
The trial court granted Defendant's motion.210 Before trial, the
defense requested permission to question Ms. Cary, in front of
the jury, as to Eric's absence. 211 Oneok wanted Ms. Cary to tes-
tify that Eric's absence was due to his lack of memory, and not
because he was too disfigured. 212 The court settled the question
Petitioner's Brief at 5 (citing the mechanical code of the Building Officials and
Code Administrators International); Respondent's Brief at 2 n.2. The Cary home
was exempt from such requirement because the 18" requirement only applied to
newly installed water heaters. See Petitioner's Brief at 5; Respondent's Brief at 2
n.2.
202. See Petitioner's Brief at 10.
203. See Respondent's Brief at 2 n.2, 7.
204. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 202 (Okla. 1997).
205. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., No. 81-356, 1-2 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994). Summary
judgment was ordered in favor of the manufacturer and retailer of both the water
heater and gasoline container. See id. at 2 n.1.
206. See id.
207. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 202.
208. See id. at 202 (Okla. 1997).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 202.
212. See id.
1998] 219
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
by plainly stating: "[His lack of memory is] not the reason he's
not here. He's not here because he's scarred so badly I think it
would be unfairly prejudicial." 213 The liability phase of the trial
proceeded, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant.2 14
Eric Cary appealed the trial court's decision to the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals, Third Division.215 He alleged that
the trial court erred in bifurcating the trial and in keeping him
from attending his trial.216 On the bifurcation issue, the court
held that "Eric fail [ed] to demonstrate [that] the bifurcation was
prejudicial and detrimental, and that the trial court abused its
discretion by making a clearly erroneous conclusion and judg-
ment, against reason and evidence." 217 On the issue of exclu-
sion, Eric argued that the Oklahoma Constitution, Article II,
Section 6, mandated that the courts of Oklahoma be open to
every citizen.218 The court answered that "this constitutional
provision has been construed as requiring that a litigant be
given 'open access' to a court."219
The court also found unpersuasive Eric's argument that,
because of his absence, he was unable to assist his counsel. 220
Finally, the court rejected Eric's argument that his dismissal
from the courtroom violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990,221 stating "[a] party will not be permitted to raise an
issue before this Court for the first time on appeal."222 The
court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision in its
entirety.223
213. Cary, 940 P.2d at 202.
214. See id.
215. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., No. 81-356 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
216. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 202.
217. See Cary, No. 81-356 at 3.
218. See id.
219. Id. (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915,
919 (Okla. 1989)).
220. See Cary, No. 81-356 at 3-4 (citing Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766
F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985)).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (1994).
222. Cary, No. 81-356 at 4 (citing Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co., 786 P.2d
1230 (Okla. 1989)).
223. See Cary, No. 81-356 at 4.
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C. The Majority Opinion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Eric Cary was properly excluded from trial.224
Writing for the majority, Justice Summers stated that "only in
the case of extreme circumstances may a party be excluded from
the proceedings," and found that Eric's appearance and young
age were not "extreme circumstances."225 The majority con-
cluded that "[i] t is impermissible that [Eric] is kept from observ-
ing and participating in the proceedings solely because of his
status as a party who was burned, and is thus physically
scarred."226
Despite finding that a plaintiff could only be excluded in
"extreme circumstances," the court went on to apply the
Helminski test.227 Recall that the Helminski test allows plain-
tiff exclusion only when the plaintiffs physical condition may
cause jury prejudice and when plaintiffs cannot comprehend the
proceeding, nor aid counsel during the proceeding. 228 Liberally
construing the Helminski factors, the majority determined that
neither requirement of the Helminski test was met.229 Although
the majority found that possible jury prejudice might occur,
Justice Summers stated, "[w]e do not agree... that the likeli-
hood ofjury sympathy is the equivalent of prejudice."230 He con-
tinued, "[tihe record is far from clear that Eric could not
meaningfully comprehend what was going on."231 The majority
then cited several cases where young plaintiffs were permitted
to remain in the courtroom despite their inability to completely
understand the proceedings, 232 stating that "a child Eric's age
likely has some understanding of the basic events of a trial as
they occur, and there is nothing in the record to the contrary."233
224. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d at 201 (Okla. 1997).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 204-205.
227. See id. at 203.
228. See id. at 205.
229. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 205.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. (citing Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394
(8th Cir. 1945); Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. La.
1974)).
233. Cary, 940 P.2d at 205.
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Further, the majority opined that "Oneok failed to show
that Eric Cary would have been no assistance to his attor-
ney."234 Justice Summers noted that Eric did have some recol-
lection of the event, and, even had he not, that "physical
presence of a party cannot be anticipated, as developments may
occur at trial that were unplanned by the attorney. '235 The ma-
jority also found that Helminski was factually distinguishable
from the present case. 236 There, the plaintiff was developmen-
tally retarded, autistic, not toilet trained, and unable to
speak.237 The majority reasoned that without his disfiguring in-
juries, Eric was by all accounts a normal six-year-old boy.238 In
reaching its decision, the majority relied on the jury's ability to
find facts independent of emotion, 239 noting that "[a] jury will
generally follow the court's instructions and decide a case based
on the law presented." 240
The majority believed that the Helminski test promulgated
too harsh a rule, stating that "[tihere may need to be a re-exam-
ination of those cases, including Helminski, which hold that a
disfigured plaintiff may be excluded if he or she cannot aid the
attorney or comprehend the proceedings." 241 In dicta, the ma-
jority referred to the Americans with Disabilities Act 242 in de-
fense of its argument. 243 After quoting the relevant language of
the ADA, 24 the court observed that "there may be some case
law that will need re-evaluation in light of the Act" because
many exclusion decisions were decided prior to the enactment of
the ADA.245
The majority realized the practical limits on a plaintiffs
right to be at trial, and agreed with the dissent insofar as a
party's right to be at trial is not absolute.246 It contemplated
234. Id. at 206.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 206.
239. See id. at 205.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
243. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 205.
244. See supra text accompanying note 242.
245. Cary, 940 P.2d at 205 n.5.
246. See id. at 204.
222 [Vol. 19:195
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/8
CARY V. ONEOK, INC.
"situations in which the disruptive behavior of a party would
necessitate the party's exclusion... and a trial may proceed af-
ter a party has voluntarily waived the right to be present."247
Nevertheless, the majority did not find that Eric's condition fit
into this rubric. 248
In conclusion, the majority held that, if Eric's absence was
to be characterized as harmless error, it would "trivialize his
right to observe and be a part of the proceedings which likely
will profoundly influence much of the rest of his life. '249 The
majority ordered that the lower court's decision be vacated, and
that judgment for the defendant be reversed.250
D. The Dissent
The dissent criticized the majority for "desiring... to avoid
a result perceived to be harsh," and attacked the decision on five
fronts.251 First, the dissent argued that Eric was adequately
represented by his next friend (Ms. Cary), so that no statutory
or constitutional prejudice had taken place. 252 The dissent ex-
plained that, because Eric was statutorily prohibited from
bringing suit against Oneok,253 his interest shifted from that of
dominus litus254 to that of beneficiary.255 Justice Opala wrote:
"Although the minor is the sole real party interest.., as a per-
son non sui juris he is not party to the suit but a beneficiary of
its proceeds." 256 Thus, the dissent saw no error in excluding
247. Id. at 204.
248. See id. at 205.
249. Id. at 206.
250. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 206.
251. Cary, 940 P.2d at 206 (Opala, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 207.
253. Oklahoma's statute regarding litigious minors is as follows:
INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PERSONS. Whenever an infant or incompetent
person has a representative, such as a general guradian, committee, conservator,
or other like fiduciary, the represetative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant
or incompetent person. .. "
OKLA. STAT. tit.12, § 2017(C) (1991).
254. Dominus litis is defined as "master of the suit, i.e., the person who was
really and directly interested in the suit as a party, as distinguished from his at-
torney or advocate." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 487 (6th. ed. 1990).
255. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 208-10 (Okla. 1997) (Opala, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 210 (emphasis removed). Non sui juris is defined as "not of his own
right; not possessing full social and civil rights; under guardianship." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY, 1000 (6th ed. 1990).
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Eric because he "cannot be viewed as a true party plaintiff,"
257
and because his mother acquired the role of dominus litus.258
The dissent did not believe that Eric was prejudiced by his
exclusion at trial. 259 Because Eric was not to be called as a wit-
ness, exclusion did not prevent him from testifying at trial.
260
Plaintiffs counsel asserted that Eric's presence at trial would
have affected the veracity of witnesses.261 Justice Opala dis-
agreed, stating that "[tihe record does not disclose how a wit-
ness fabrication would ever have been deterred by the presence
of a child whose inability accurately to recount the circum-
stances leading to his injury was known to opposing counsel
and to all witnesses in the case."262
Second, the dissent condemned the court's decision to disre-
gard "a rich body of national jurisprudence" on the issue of
plaintiff exclusion.263 The dissent enumerated a three-part
test,264 based on Helminski, which the trial court was obliged to
follow before excluding Eric. 265 According to the dissent, be-
cause the trial court correctly followed the three-step inquiry,
the decision to exclude was error free. 266 The dissent also noted
257. Cary at 211 (Opala, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 209-11.
259. See id. at 211.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Cary, 940 P.2d at 211 (Opala, J. dissenting).
263. Id. at 212.
264. According to the dissent, a court may exclude a plaintiff from the pro-
ceedings if the following three steps are met:
First, the nisi prius judge must determine if a litigant's appearance or con-
duct is likely to prejudice the jury against a defendant who seeks to bar that
litigant's attendance. Second, if prejudice be found probably to result from a
litigant's presence, the court must next direct its probe to whether the ex-
cluded litigant's testimony is either expected or necessary in light of that
person's ability to comprehend the proceedings about to be conducted. Fi-
nally, the court must assess the negative legal fallout, if any, from the ex-
cluded person's absence upon the quality of process that is that person's due.
If the excluded litigant's presence is not critical to his effective representa-
tion at trial, there is less or little prejudice to the fairness factor from that
person's absence. A litigant's presence could not be viewed as critical if he/
she has no capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel in
their conduct.
Id. (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted).
265. See id. at 212.
266. See id. at 213.
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that "[wihere issues of liability and damages are to be tried to-
gether, a litigant's presence in the courtroom should not be re-
stricted."267 It therefore conceded that, without bifurcation, Eric
would not have been properly excluded from trial.268 The dis-
sent stressed, however, that this case was bifurcated. 269 Thus,
Justice Opala criticized the majority for citing single-issue cases
as authority. 270
Third, the dissent opined that allowing Eric to attend trial
would violate Oneok's right to an impartial trial guaranteed by
both the Oklahoma 271 and Federal272 Constitutions. 273 The dis-
sent argued that, once a movant has satisfied its burden of pro-
duction and persuasion by fulfilling the requirements of the
three-part test,274 the movant becomes clothed in the protec-
tions of due process, which guarantee the defendant an impar-
tial trial.275 Despite the harsh overtones, the dissent argued
that weighing a plaintiffs right to attend trial against a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial was a matter of necessary procedure. 276
Justice Opala wrote: "Chaos, caprice and ad hoc pronounce-
ments would inevitably follow the slightest departure from an
even-handed procedural regime."277
Fourth, the dissent argued that the majority incorrectly re-
weighed evidence that was before the trial court. 278 It found
that the re-weighing of evidence was inappropriate because the
trial court's decision to exclude was not an abuse of discre-
267. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 213 (Opala, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 212-13.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 213. Specifically, Justice Opala questioned the majority's use
of Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952), Chicago Great
Western Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945), Anderson v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. La. 1974), and Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993,
641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 1996). See id.
271. The Oklahoma Constitution, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "No per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
OKLA. CONST. art. Il, § 7.
272. The U.S. Constitution, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "...nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
273. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 206 (Opala, J., dissenting).
274. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
275. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 214 (Opala, J., dissenting).
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
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tion.279 According to the dissent, in order to reverse on an
abuse-of-discretion standard, the reviewing court must find the
lower court's decision to be clearly erroneous. 280 The dissent ar-
gued that "[t]he conduct of a jury trial lies within the sound dis-
cretion of the nisi prius judge, and the trial court is duty-bound
to withhold from the triers any material deemed prejudicial." 281
Thus, because Eric was excluded using the correct procedural
analysis, viz the three-part test, the dissent found no abuse of
discretion by the trial court.28 2 The dissent also noted that it
would be manifestly unfair to promulgate a rule that was un-
known to the parties at the time of trial.28 3
Lastly, the dissent criticized the court's use of the ADA,
stating that "[b]ecause [the mother] did not press this issue at
nisi prius, neither the appellate nor this court (on certiorari)
may reach it on review."28 4 The dissent asserted that using the
ADA, even in dicta, was inappropriate because "[c]ourts are not
allowed to forecast what they might do about an issue that is
not before them."28 5 The dissent concluded, "[a] reversal... may
not be grounded either on some theory invoked sua sponte or on
any pressed argument which lacks record support."28 6
IV. Analysis
In finding that Eric was improperly excluded from trial,28 7
the Oklahoma Supreme Court correctly invoked the heightened
level of scrutiny that should be adopted by courts whenever
plaintiff exclusion is at issue.
While this case note does not advocate that a party to a civil
proceeding has an absolute constitutional right to attend
trial,288 it does join Cary in saying that Helminski28 9 impermis-
279. See id.
280. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 214 (Opala, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 215 (citing Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co., 786 P.2d 1230, 1237
(Okla. 1990) and Mills v. Mills, 512 P.2d 143, 145 (Okla. 1973)).
285. Cary, 940 P.2d at 215 (Opala, J., dissenting) (citing Hughey v. Grand
River Dam Auth., 897 P.2d 1138, 1143-44 (Okla. 1995)).
286. Id. at 215 (emphasis removed).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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sibly allows for plaintiff exclusion. This case note advances
three general arguments why the Helminski test is flawed and
why the more rigorous standard established in Cary should be
applied. First, juries should be trusted to reach a just decision
despite the influence of a sympathetic plaintiff. Second, the
plaintiffs right to be in the courtroom and confront a wrongdoer
is a basic precept of the adversary system. Third, excluding a
plaintiff from the courtroom is in violation of both the letter and
intent of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 2
90
A. Trust the Jury
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a person left
unaffected after seeing a disfigured plaintiff. Even if one could
be found, discovering eleven companions would be hopeless.
Undoubtedly, jurors will feel for a burned, handicapped, or dys-
functional plaintiff.291 It would be utterly naive to believe that
once in a jury box, the juror leaves her entire background, bias
and compassion behind.292
The Cary majority correctly believed that despite these
very human qualities, jurors can nevertheless be trusted to put
emotion aside and decide a case on the merits.293 This view is
consistent with the belief that jurors, although no longer "blue
ribbon,"294 can do their job fairly, equitably, and free from sym-
pathy's grasp. 295 Jury trust is derived from an amalgam of be-
liefs. The concept of trial by one's peers is entrenched in
American judicial history,296 and an assumption exists that
every person is qualified "to do justice."297 In reality, as this au-
thor concedes, it is inherently difficult to sit in the jury box and
be devoid of compassion for a person who has suffered. Admit-
tedly, there will be those who will let sympathy overcome rea-
290. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35. See also supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
294. See supra text accompanying note 146.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
297. ABRAMSON, supra note 128, at 2. See also supra text accompanying notes
133-35, 143-44.
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son.298 However, advocates of plaintiff exclusion presuppose
that a jury box is filled with such jurors.299 This is simply not
the case.300 Experts agree that jurors are capable of putting
aside their emotions and following instructions.301 Ask yourself
- if you were charged with deciding a case involving a sympa-
thetic juror, could you rule fairly and without prejudice? Be-
cause most would agree that they are capable of doing so, and
because juries represent a "microcosm" of society, there is little
fear that a jury box will become hopelessly biased by sympa-
thetic persuasion.30 2 Indeed, diverse juries ensure that judicial
decisions are well reasoned. 30 3
Clearly, when jury decisions so often mirror those of the
legal experts, to wit, the judges, it can hardly be said that jurors
are remiss in their duty.30 4 A study determined that 79% of
judges concurred in the decision that the jury had rendered.30 5
If, as critics argue, jurors were not qualified to reach fair deci-
sions, would the level of concurrence between judge and jury be
even close to 80%? Researchers agree that the jury "under-
stands its job" and can "perform it competently."30 6 Helminski
and its progeny must be criticized for their lack of faith in the
jury's ability to find facts.
Jury sympathy that does occur can be mitigated using a va-
riety of factors.30 7 The courts can provide orientation sessions
to jurors and inform them about their role as impartial fact-
finders.308 If a case involves an especially sympathetic plaintiff,
the court may warn the jurors about what they are going to see
and instruct them to be wary of their emotions.30 9 Undoubtedly,
such instruction is not beyond a juror's comprehension. 310
298. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 145-47.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
305. See supra text accompanying note 141.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 153-65.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
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Voir dire can be used to weed out jurors who seem espe-
cially susceptible to sympathetic appearances. 311 It seems en-
tirely plausible for a practitioner to ask pointed questions to
test for emotional susceptibility. Defense counsel may use a va-
riety of trial techniques to de-emphasize the plaintiffs condi-
tion, such as exposing plaintiffs attempt to use sympathy
during opening and closing statements, 312 and using experts to
de-emphasize plaintiffs plight.313 In addition, jury instruction
can be used to once again remind jurors to put aside sympa-
thetic urges.31 4
B. Maintain the Adversary System
When courts banish plaintiffs from the courtroom, they are
removing the nucleus of adversary procedure. 315 The autonomy
of the individual litigant is the single most identifiable charac-
teristic of the adversary system.31 6 Party control of the litiga-
tion is what sets the system apart from other judicial
paradigms. 317 Yet, the idea of party control goes beyond the
mere representation of interest. The Cary dissent argued that,
because Eric was represented at trial,318 his interest was less-
ened to that of a "beneficiary."31 9 It is untenable to reduce a
plaintiffs interest in this way.320 No one can be an adequate
substitute for the plaintiffs interest at trial. A "next friend" (i.e.
a mother) can represent a plaintiff, yet can not replace his or
her interest at trial.32' A lawyer handles the development and
strategy of a case, but is not the "alter ego" of the plaintiff.322
Justice Summers aptly stated that keeping a plaintiff from his
day in court "trivialize[s] his right" to confront a wrongdoer. 323
311. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
312. See supra text accompanying note 160.
313. See supra text accompanying note 162.
314. See supra text accompanying note 163.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 110-16.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
318. Recall that Eric was represented both by counsel and his mother as next
friend.
319. See Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 209-11 (Okla. 1997).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 107-17.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 27, 35-37.
322. See supra text accompanying note 21.
323. Cary, 940 P.2d at 206.
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Eric's counsel expressed some particularly poignant analysis
when he wrote:
The party, as opposed to his or her lawyer, is the human being
whose future is actually at stake in a trial. When this affected
individual is able to be present in the courtroom, . . . to look a
witness or prospective juror in the eye, that witness or prospective
juror may find it more difficult to lie, or to stretch the truth. "It is
always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than
'behind his back."' 324
Indeed, a witness "may feel quite differently when he has to re-
peat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by
distorting or mistaking the facts."325
The Framers chose the adversary model of justice over all
others,326 with the belief that the adversary model championed
the ideals of impartiality and zealous advocacy. 327 Unlike the
inquisitorial model of justice, the adversary system allows par-
ties the unrestrained ability to bring forth their most salient
arguments. 328 But, is it not "strange indeed" to think that a
party can bring forth its most salient case without the plaintiff
stepping foot in the courtroom? 329 As in Eric's case, it is often
"far from clear that [a plaintiffi [can] not meaningfully compre-
hend what was going on."330
A plaintiffs ability to confront a wrongdoer - to make re-
sponsible parties answer for their actions - is vital in the adver-
sary process. 331 Without direct involvement, a plaintiffs
satisfaction with a decision may be wholly unfulfilling.332 This
applies, perhaps counter-intuitively, to both favorable and ad-
verse decisions. 333 Favorable decisions, even when large sums
of money are involved, can leave an excluded plaintiff feeling
324. Petitioner's Brief at 17, Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201 (Okla. 1997)
(No. 81-356) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988)).
325. Coy, 487 U.S. 1012, 1089 (quoting Z. Chaffee, Jr., THE BLESSING OF LIB-
ERTY 35 (1956)).
326. See supra text accompanying note 93.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
328. See supra text accompanying note 106.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29, 39-40.
330. Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201, 205 (Okla. 1997).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 109 and 116.
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ambivalent.334 It is unlikely that any sum of money can substi-
tute for an accounting of a wrongdoer's action.
This is not to say that a party may never be excluded from
trial. As the Cary court perceived, 3 5 there are extreme circum-
stances for which exclusion is necessary. 336 One can imagine
circumstances where a plaintiff is so disruptive that trial cannot
practically proceed or where counsel's motive is to shamelessly
parade a plaintiff in front of the jury in an attempt to arouse
sympathy.33 7 Seemingly, the Helminski test was formulated to
address these circumstances, and to ensure that defendant's
due process rights to a fair trial are upheld.338 However,
Helminski swings the pendulum too far. It sets forth a stan-
dard that too easily abrogates plaintiffs right to attend trial. 339
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act and it Applicability
to Excluded Plaintiffs
Although the Cary court only addressed the ADA issue in
dicta, its analysis may have been a prophetic depiction of the
future of plaintiff exclusion. 340 Analysis of the ADA's Subtitle II
supports the supposition that plaintiffs seeking redress are pro-
tected from exclusion under the ADA.341
According to the ADA, "public entities" are not to deny
handicapped persons any benefit, service or program.342 Courts
have construed "public entities" to include the judiciary. 343 So,
as long as a plaintiff can show that he or she is in fact "dis-
abled,"344 the ADA prohibits courts from excluding plaintiffs
from trial. The regulations established pursuant to the ADA
334. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
335. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 204.
336. See supra text accompanying note 34 and 37
337. See supra text accompanying note 44.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 263-70.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 107-17.
340. See Cary, 940 P.2d at 205.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 166-81.
342. See supra text accompanying note 171.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 176-81 (setting forth the three-part
test to determine whether a person qualifies as "disabled"). Note that although
Eric does not clearly pass the three-part test, Congress explicitly stated that se-
vere burn victims are "disabled," because the effect of their appearance is a limita-
tion on major life activity. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
1998]
37
PACE LAW REVIEW
state that a public entity shall not deny a "qualified handi-
capped person"345 of a "service" that the public entity pro-
vides. 346 Arguably, there is no judicial character more fitting of
the title "qualified individual" than a plaintiff in a civil trial;
and when a court denies a plaintiff the right to attend his or her
own trial, it has denied a "service."347 The ADA regulations also
state that a public entity may not aid or perpetuate discrimina-
tion against a disabled person. 348 To be sure, a court effectively
perpetuates discrimination when it complies with a defendant's
request to keep a plaintiff out of court.
After courts have been identified as "public entities," and
plaintiffs have been deemed "qualified persons," the final
threshold requirement of the ADA is for the "qualified person"
to have a "disability."349 This factor will be determined on a
case by case basis. However, considering Congress' intent to
broadly define "impairments," the rule being advocated herein
will be available to many with diverse disabilities. 350 Interpret-
ing the ADA as prohibitive of plaintiff exclusion is clearly
within the congressional intent of the ADA. Congress has sum-
marized its position as follows:
[Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society, based on charac-
teristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and re-
sulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and con-
tribute to, society; the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals
with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full partici-
pation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals .... 351
If courts continue to exclude plaintiffs, they will surely run
afoul of Congress' intent to admonish "stereotypic assumptions"
of disabled persons' ability to participate in society. Thus,
345. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
346. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
347. See cases cited supra note 34.
348. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
349. See supra text accompanying note 176.
350. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
351. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(7)-(8) (1994).
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based on the above statutory analysis, and the analysis in Part
II(D) of this case note, it appears that a plaintiff who has been
excluded from his or her own trial may have a valid claim under
the ADA.
V. Conclusion
Despite the substantial weight of authority to the contrary,
the Cary court correctly upheld Eric's right to be at trial, de-
spite his limited understanding of the trial and ability to aid
counsel. In doing so, the court dispelled the "stereotypical as-
sumption" that juries are unable to displace their sympathy.352
In addition, Cary ensures that Oneok will be made to answer
not only to the court and counsel, but also to Eric himself.3 53
Hopefully, the Cary decision will thrust the minority position
into the majority, and the Helminski test will become extinct.
Matthew A. Sokol*
352. See Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993, 994, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (3d
Dep't 1996).
353. See supra text accompanying note 323.
* The author would like to thank Brian Belowich and his editorial group for
their hard work in editing this article.
To my beautiful wife Alison, for her love and support.
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